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n Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argues that names are 
rigid designators. For Kripke, a term "rigidly designates" 
an object if it picks out that object wherever it exists, in all 
possible worlds. Additionally, to employ David Bostock's 
analysis, Kripke argues 1/ that identity-statements in which both 
terms are rigid designators are necessarily true if they are true at 
all" (313). Here Kripke has in mind statements of the sort /I a is b," 
in which the verb, is, has the character of identity (as opposed to 
predication, etc.), e.g. "a square is a parallelogram having four 
equal sides and four right angles." Kripke writes that philoso­
phers have been interested in identity statements of three sorts: 
those employing descriptions, identity statements between 
names, and theoretical statements in science. He contends that 
identity statements involving descriptions, e.g., "the first Post­
master General of the United States is the inventor of bifocals/' 
are contingent. Of names and theoretical statements in science, 
however, true identity statements of this sort are true necessarily 
so. 
Initially in this essay, I will provide an account of Kripke's 
claim regarding the necessity of identity statements. I will give a 
systematic analysis of the structure of Kripke's argument, facili­
tating an examination of the mechanics of the argument and my 
critique thereof. My criticism lies in the challenge to Kripke's 
intuitive claim that proper names are rigid designators, and that 
therefore the relation expressed in an identity statement between 
a name and the object it picks out is a necessmy one. I will argue 
that identity statements (employing descriptions, in names, and 
in statements in science) are contingent, not necessary, under­
mining Kripke's notion of the a posteriori identity. Ultimately, this 
critique challenges Kripke's fundamental notion of rigid designa-
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tion, the implications of which will be indicated in the conclu­
sion. 
Kripke on the Necessity of Identity Statements 
I begin my analysis with the distinction Kripke notes 
between a statement which is necessarily true and a statement 
which is contingently so. This distinction will prove useful in the 
analysis throughout the paper. He writes: 
We ask whether something might have been true, 
or might have been false. Well, if something is 
false, it's obviously not necessarily true. If it is 
true, might it have been otherwise? Is it possible 
that, in this respect, the world should have been 
different from the way it is? If the answer is /I no/' 
then this fact about the world is a necessary one. If 
the answer is /I yes/' then this fact about the world 
is a contingent one. (258) 
The key to Kripke's account seems to be the question of whether 
or not something might have turned out. otherwise. For some­
thing to be necessarily true, it could not have been different from 
the way it is. A necessary truth implies that the world could not 
possibly be different in this respect. In contrast, contingent facts 
are such that they are not necessarily so. We could imagine the 
world in a way such that a contingent fact may have turned out 
otherwise. 
At this point, Kripke wants to note the distinction be­
tween necessary and a priori. Truths about the world which are 
necessary could not have been otherwise; this is not to say that 
they are discovered a priori on Kripke's account. He writes, /lIt's 
certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious 
definitional equivalence, either that everything a priori is neces­
sary or that everything necessary is a priori" (258). Here he cites a 
fundamental difference between the metaphysical nature of nec­
essary truths and the epistemological character of a priori knowl­
edge. Kripke's assertion regarding true identity statements with 
terms that are rigid designators, then, is that the world could not 
have possibly turned out otherwise. This is especially important 
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for theoretical statements in science, for instance, which on 
Kripke's analysis consist of two rigid designators and reveal a 
necessary truth about the world, even though scientific facts are 
obviously discovered empirically. 
This leads to an investigation of the notion of rigid desig­
nation, and the terms to which it applies. Kripke defines the rigid 
designator as that which picks out the same object in every 
possible world; " ... a designator rigidly designates a certain object 
if it designates that object wherever that object exists" (259). 
Intuitively, he claims that proper names are rigid designators. 
This means that 'Sinatra,' for instance, picks out the same person 
"wherever that object exists." In any possible way we can think of 
the world, then, 'Sinatra' must designate that same person, viz., 
Sinatra. On Kripke's analysis, though Sinatra may not have been 
the leader of the Rat Pack, it is not the case that he might not have 
been Sinatra (even had he not been called 'Sinatra'). Identity 
statements between names, then, become an important focus for 
Kripke's analysis. Statements like IICicero is Tully," or "Hesperus 
is Phosphorus," express a necessary identity on Kripke's account 
as these proper names necessarily pick out the same object in 
every possible world. If, for Kripke, these identity statements are 
true at all, they are true necessarily so. 
The same analysis applies, for Kripke, to identily state­
ments regarding scientific theory. That light is a stream of pho­
tons; that heat is a form of energy proportional to the molecular 
motions of a substance; that water is H20, all express necessary 
identity relations. On Kripke's account, then, (and certainly Put­
nam's as well), water is H20 in all possible worlds. It is important 
to keep in mind that both terms in the identity statement are rigid 
designators. Thus, in an interesting sense, 'water' designates H20 
in all possible worlds as 'H20' designates H20 in all possible 
worlds. Similarly, regarding names, the rigid designator 
'Hesperus' picks out Venus in all possible worlds as does 
'Phosphorus.' (As does 'Venus,' for that matter.) Writes Kripke in 
the construction of a counterfactual example: 
Someone goes by and he calls two different stars 
IIHesperus" and "Phosphorus." It may even be 
under the same conditions as prevailed when we 
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introduced the names "Hesperus" and 
"Phosphorus." But are those circumstances in 
which Hesperus is not Phosphorus or would not 
have been Phosphorus? It seems to me that they 
are not. Now, of course I'm committed to saying 
that they're not, by saying that such terms as 
"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus," when used as 
names, are rigid designators. They refer in every 
possible world to the planet Venus. (267) 
Kripke therefore argues that in every possible world, even one in 
which the terms "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" identify different 
objects, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus/ as we use the terms, still 
both refer to Venus. As such, the identity statement, "Hesperus is 
Phosphorus" is necessarily true: 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' 
designate the object Venus wherever that object exists. 
The notion that Kripke defends here is that true identity 
statements discovered a posteriori are necessarily true. E.g., state­
ments like "light is a stream of photons/' or "Hesperus is Phos­
phorus/, which are discovered empirically, are necessarily h'ue 
on Kripke's account. This analysis overturns the traditional philo­
sophical claim that facts discovered a posteriori are contingent, not 
necessary. The question I will examine, then, is: does this account 
make sense? Can, we accept Kripke's intuitive claim that true a 
posteriori identity statements express necessarily true relations, and 
what are the implications of our conclusion? 
Structural Analysis of Kripke's Argument 
To further the analysis, I will examine the mechanics of 
Kripke's theory following the systematic account given by 
Micllael Wreen in the article "Proper Names and the Necessity of 
Identity Statements." Wreen analyzes the argument of Kripke 
into four distinct propositions, illustrated by Kripke's discussion 
of the necessary relationship of identity between Hesperus and 
Phosphorus. The first point of the argument is that, 
a. 'Hesperus' designates Hesperus (Venus). 
This, according to Kripke is, of course, true. Additionally, 
b. 'Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus (Venus). 
These are uncontroversial claims regarding the way in which we 
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use the terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus/ and these being true, 
c. 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' designate the same object (viz., 
Venus). 
On Kripke's analysis, then, this being the case, 
d. Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
It is essential to note, however, that the naming of a term, e.g., 
'''Hesperus' designates Hesperus (Venus)" is contingent. (As 
well as that '''Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus (Venus).") 
Kripke writes, " .. .in a counterfactual world in which 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' were not used in the way that we use them, as 
names of this planet, but as names of some other objects, one 
could have had qualitatively identical evidence and concluded 
that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' named two different objects" 
(268). This is important to note, as the way the terms 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' are used may certainly have been otherwise. 
We need not go so far at this point even to assume a counterfac­
tual situation in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' designate 
two distinct objects. All I need to indicate here is that it is a 
contingent fact that we use the term 'Hesperus' to designate Venus 
and the term 'Phosphorus' to designate Venus. 
An additional point which is essential to note here is that 
according to Kripke's causal theory of reference, causal connec­
tions themselves are contingent. On this account, the reference of 
a term is determined by a causal chain of users of tha t term, who 
intend to refer to the same object as did the persons from whom 
they learned the term, ultimately grounded in the object itself. 
Kripke writes, "An initial 'baptism' takes place. Here the object 
may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be 
fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from link to 
link,' the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he 
learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom 
he heard it" (266). Here Kripke implies the contingency of causal 
connections, first, as the II initial baptism" of a term certainly 
could have been different. Additionally, the referent of a term is 
entirely dependent upon the contingent meaning derived from a 
causal link in a community of speakers. Wreen comments: 
If [that causal connections are contingent] is true, 
and if token-names designate what they do in 
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virtue of being causally tied to the objects they 
designate, then the facts that 'Hesperus' desig­
nates Hesperus, and 'Phosphorus' designates 
Phosphorus would have to be contingent them­
selves. (322) 
It is certainly contingent that reference should be derived 
through a causal link among speakers of a term. One cannot 
demonstrate a necessary relation between the "initial baptism" of 
a term and the term's referring to that same object in a community 
of speakers-using the term as understood through causal con­
nections. The fact that 'Hesperus' designates Hesperus and 
'Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus is demonstrated, then, to be 
a contingent one. 
The Contingency of Identity Statements 
We have shown that the first two propositions of Kripke's 
argument are contingent, that 'Hesperus' designates Hesperus 
(Venus) and 'Phosphorus' deSignates Phosphorus (Venus). It 
follows, then, that the third pOint, '''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' 
both pick out the same object (Venus)" is contingent as well. 
Wreen writes, "if it's contingent that a certain causal chain is 
grounded in an object, and contingent that a second causal chain 
is grounded in an object, it would certainly seem to be contingent 
that both causal chains are grounded in the same object" (322). 
The argument itself is simple: a is contingent, b is contingent, 
therefore, aand b are contingent. If '''Hesperus' designates Hespe­
rus (Venus) and 'Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus (Venus)" is 
contingent, then, that '''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' pick out 
Venus" is also contingent. 
David Bostock takes up this point with a counterfactual 
example in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer to two 
different objects. He hypothesizes that two planets/stars may 
have had orbits such that the morning and evening appearances 
of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are indistinguishable from 
what they are now. Bostock writes, "a situation in which Hespe­
rus has one orbit and Phosphorus another is evidently a situation 
in which they are different planets" (319). Kripke's analysis 
would seem to concede this point. However, Kripke goes on to 
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write, " ... still that's not a case in which Hesperus wasn't Phos­
phorus. For there couldn't have been such a case, given that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus" (267). On Kripke's account, what is key 
is the way in which we use the terms 'Hesperus' and 
'Phosphorus.' To illustrate this, Kripke contends: 
But we, using the names as we do right now, can 
say in advance, that if Hesperus and Phosphorus 
are one and the same, then in no other possible 
world can they be different. We use "Hesperus" as 
the name of a certain body and "Phosphorus" as 
the name of a certain body. We use them as names 
of those bodies in all possible worlds. If, in fact, 
they are the same body, then in any other possible 
world we have to use them as a name of that 
object. And so in any other possible world it will 
be true that Hesperus is Phosphorus. (268) 
I should mention two significant points here relating to Kripke's 
analysis. The first is that Bostock's analysis, not Kripke's, accu­
rately reflects the way we use the terms 'Hesperus' and 
'Phosphorus.' The hypothetical scenario posits a situation in 
which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' actually do refer to two 
distinct objects. The construct of the other possible world itself 
thus ensures that the way these terms are used refers to different 
objects. 
The second point is that Kripke's analysis presupposes 
the very conclusion he is trying to prove. Kripke wants to get at 
the notion that in all possible worlds, 'Hesperus' and 
'Phosphorus' refer to the same object. He does this by asserting 
that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' must, in every possible world, 
refer to the same object. Bostock's counterfactual example, how­
ever, provides a seemingly unconlTOversial account on which the 
terms do not both refer to Venus. In this situation, Hesperus is 
certainly not Phosphorus. Kripke's assertion seems to be, ironi­
cally, counterintuitive. It is important to keep in mind Kripke's 
analysis regarding the nature of necessary truths versus contin­
gent facts. Contingent facts are such that they could have been 
otherwise. The analysis here implies that the relationship of 
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identity between Hesperus and Phosphorus could have been 
otherwise, thus the identity relation itself is contingent. 
Rigid Designation and Other Possible Worlds 
The essential tenet to Kripke's notion of rigid designation 
is that the rigid designator picks out the same object wherever 
that object exists, in all possible worlds. It is interesting to note, 
however, that in certain circumstances (detailed by Kripke), a 
rigid designator may not actually pick out an object at all. Con­
sider Kripke's analysis of the proper name, Nixon. 'Nixon/ 
Kripke argues, would not only refer to the man Nixon had he not 
been called Nixon, but further, would refer to the man Nixon even 
if Nixon did not exist. The rigid designator, then,does not 
actually pick out one distinct object in every possible world. 
Additionally, consider the counterfactual situation detailed 
above. In it, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer to two different 
objects, though in the II actual" world, they refer to only one. 
Bostock summarizes the situation as such, /I the number of entities 
referred to when specifying a counterfactual situation need not be 
the same as the number of entities ill the situation so specified" 
(319). The Nixon example is such that one refers to an object not 
in the situation at all. JI":[esperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer twice to 
one planet, though in the scenario specified, there nre two. Thus 
Bostock concludes, II there is no inference from rigidity of desig­
nation ... to what can coherently be supposed to happen in coun­
terfactual situations" (319). Kripke's argument for necessary 
identity is such that'a=b' is a necessary truth if a=b is true and a 
and b are rigid designators. It does not necessarily follow, how­
ever, that a or b must exist; in another possible world, a may 
designate an object while b does not. 
Here it is helpful to consider a thought experiment as 
introduced by Helen Steward in the article "Identity Statements 
and the Necessary A Posteriori." Her thought experiment is such 
that a rare particle, similar to a proton (named proton-B), is found 
in the nucleus of an atom and has a slightly stronger attraction to 
surrounding electrons than does a normal proton. This leads to 
variations in melting points and boiling points of various sub­
stances and ultimately may lead to entirely different experien­
tially physical manifestations of the same atomic structure. She 
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writes: 
What is important is that all plausibility has gone 
out of the claim that H20 and water are the very 
same substance, once the properties to which that 
particular chemical constitution gives rise are al­
lowed to vary in the way described. In the possible 
world envisaged, then, water is not identical with 
H20. And so the claim that this identity is a neces­
sary truth must be false. (391) 
On Steward's analysis, H20 may pick out an infinite number of 
different substances in other possible worlds. With a "normal" 
proton it may designate a clear liquid, while with "proton-B" it 
may be a purple solid. This indicates a fundamental problem 
with Kripke's notion of rigid designation and its relation to the 
necessity of identity statements. Steward argues, in fact, that H20 
cannot be a rigid designator as it fails to pick out the same object 
in every possible world. On Kripke's own account, then, the 
identity statement, "water=H20" could not be a necessary iden­
tity as both of the terms are not rigid designators. 
This analysis applies to other theoretical statements in 
science and proper names as well. 'Hesperus,' even as we use the 
term, does not need to designate the same object in all possible 
worlds, viz., Phosphorus. 'Hesperus/ as we use the term, picks 
out the object we see in the morning sky that is Venus, that in the 
"actuaY' world is Phosphorus. Given Bostock's scenario, how­
ever, 'Hesperus/ which still picks out the object we see in the 
morning sky, fails to designate the experientially indistinguish­
able Phosphorus. The underlying notion, then, is that the concept 
of rigid designation is problematic. Writes Steward: 
An important feature of the term 'H20' is that it 
picks out, in every possible world, the substance 
that has the chemical constitution H20 in that 
world, so that, unless we have a watertight guar­
antee that the H20 in every possible world is 
bound to be the same stuff, there will be possible 
worlds in which H20 is not the familiar, clear, 
colorless substance we call water. (394) 
67 Against 'the Necessity of Identity Statements 
Terms like 'H20' or 'Phosphorus' may, in other logically possible 
worlds, pick out objects other than they do in the actual world. 
This analysis certainly challenges Kripke's claim regarding neces­
sary identities and means that rigid designation becomes trivial: 
H 20 refers to H20. 
This is a fundamental critique of Kripke's notion of the 
necessity of identity statements as it indicts his intuitive assump­
tion regarding the nature of proper names and natural kind 
terms. Kripke's principal argument for the necessity of identity 
statements is that rigid designation necessitates what can coher­
ently be supposed in counterfactual situations. Kripke contends 
that 'water' necessarily picks out H20 in all possible worlds, thus 
the identity statement, "water is H20" is necessarily true. The 
analysis that rigid designation, however, fails to necessarily de­
termine identity in other possible worlds undermines this asser­
tion. 
Contingency in This World 
The analysis in the essay indicates the contingency of the 
statement, '''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' pick out the same object 
(Venus)." The argument is initiated in the demonstrated contin­
gency of the fundamental identity statements themselves, I:hat 
'Hesperus' picks out Hesperus (Venus) and that 'Phosphorus' 
picks out Phosphorus (Venus). The conclusion, then, is supported 
by the analysis of rigid. designation and other possible worlds. 
The notion of rigid designation fails when we construct other 
logically possible worlds in which "rigid designators" fail to pick 
out the same object. Given this account, Kripke's argument for 
the necessity of identity statements collapses. 
Here I want to push the argument that the statement 
'''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both pick out Venus" is contin­
gent. Kripke concludes that Hesperus is Phosphorus because the 
terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' necessarily pick out the sarne 
object. He writes, 1/ ••• using the names as we do right now, [we] 
can say in advance, that if Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and 
the same, then in no other possible world can they be different" 
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(268). Having shown, however, that circumstances could have 
been otherwise, that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' contingently 
pick out the same object, it follows that the identity statement, 
"Hesperus is Phosphorus" is ultimately contingent. This argu­
ment fundamentally undermines Kripke's project of demonstrat­
ing the necessity of identity statements. Kripke's view has impor­
tant implications for the philosoPI:ty of language, beyond rigid 
designation to theories of reference and broader concerns regard­
ing essentialism and epistemology. What the analysis in the essay 
demonstrates is that rigid designators fail to necessarily identify 
the same object in all possible worlds and that Kripke's conclu­
sion regarding the necessity of identity statements from this 
analysis is flawed. If we conclude, then, that a posteriori identity 
statements are contingent, we move the discourse in the relevant 
fields forward, having gained an important insight. 
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